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How South African Citizens Evaluate Their Economic Obligations to the State

EVAN S. LIEBERMAN

This article explores the relationship between feelings about political community and citizen evaluations of the state's demands for taxation. It finds preliminary support for the hypothesis that to the extent that individuals identify themselves with the state-sponsored view of the nation, they will perceive the allocation of costs and benefits to be more 'fair', and will be more inclined to comply with demands for taxation. This conclusion is based upon analysis of a 1997 dataset resulting from a national survey of adult South Africans, a society characterised by a great diversity of feelings about political community, and other socio-economic factors.

I. ECONOMIC OBLIGATIONS TO THE STATE AND WHY PEOPLE PAY

Why are some people inclined to pay their taxes, while others are not? The question is of enormous importance because the costs of collection may be prohibitive when citizens actively seek to shirk their economic obligations.¹ Using strict rational choice assumptions, we should expect such behaviour from *all* citizens, and we should be puzzled that *anyone* would be inclined to pay, given the high incentives to free ride. And yet, states have collected more than one-fifth of global production in the form of taxes in recent years. Such high levels of compliance suggest that an individual rationalist approach may incorrectly model how citizens evaluate their economic obligations to the state. This article argues that citizens evaluate the costs and benefits of state demands with a different logic than they do when

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engaged in the exchange economy.² It demonstrates that varied beliefs and affective attitudes about group membership or political community are key determinants of citizen attitudes towards their economic obligations to the state.

This hypothesis is evaluated through an analysis of a 1997 national survey of adult South Africans, a society with a wide range of variation on views about political community as well as other socio-economic characteristics. After centuries of racial division, South Africans are grappling with the proposition of constructing a 'rainbow nation' – a nation comprised of, and fully tolerant of South Africa's various racial and language groups. For some, the idea of a multiracial nation appears both possible and desirable, while for others, it is simply abhorrent, and contradictory. This article considers the extent to which varied responses to this new identity frame the evaluations and judgments that ultimately affect citizen behaviour.

First, it is necessary to specify what is meant by 'inclinations to comply', and why this concept is worthy of investigation. This article is not a study of tax *compliance* – that is, it does not measure the degree to which citizens *actually* fulfill their tax obligations.³ Apart from the fact that such information is extraordinarily difficult to measure at the individual level, it is surely affected by a host of complex factors, including past behaviour, state capacity to monitor and enforce payment, complexity of legislation and the interaction of such factors with citizen inclinations.⁴ Rather, the goal here is more modest, tractable, and analytically relevant for students of comparative politics: why do some individuals feel morally compelled to pay and not others. Do they feel they ought to make a financial contribution to the public treasury or not?

This normative orientation puts the spotlight on the active role citizens may play in ultimately determining state efficacy, as distinct from the role of coercion, monitoring, or other factors, including long-standing patterns of compliance. This focus assumes that for the purpose of understanding the relationship between states and societies it is less interesting to study the behaviour of citizens when there is a policeman on the block, than to observe how they behave in the absence of such a monitor.⁵ Of course, in the absence of *any* regulatory or coercive pressures, it is not likely that states would be very effective tax collectors, but as Margaret Levi [1988] points out, a certain degree of tacit or 'quasi-voluntary' compliance can be vital to revenue production. Unfortunately for some states, most of their citizens do not recognise the state's demand for taxation as appropriate or legitimate, and their inclinations to not pay result in great expenses in the form of policing or revenue losses – both of which ultimately make an impact on the fiscus. Thus, determining the factors that influence *citizen inclinations to*

comply is a question of enormous substantive relevance, let alone theoretical interest. In this article, I consider only this question, leaving aside the impact of the state's administrative and coercive capacities. In other words, this study can be viewed as part of a larger theoretical project aimed at understanding state-society relations, and state efficacy.

What are the possible explanations for variations in inclinations to comply? Analysts generally agree that perceptions of fairness or duty⁶ are critical to citizens' evaluations of their obligations, but that still begs the question, of what is considered fair, and why do some citizens feel a sense of duty and not others? If we were considering citizen attitudes *across* societies, we might look at variations in state action. Of course across both time and space, state leaders and bureaucrats behave differently, acting with different levels of impunity, using public funds for public purposes in some places, and for their own private use in others. Assuming that such corruption is considered 'unfair', it is reasonable to expect that variations in levels of corruption would affect the quality of citizenship in a commensurate manner.

This analysis attempts to account for variation that is *not* explained by such action, particularly by focusing the analysis at the individual level. What accounts for varied attitudes and inclinations within a single society, in which there is a single government, with a single set of policies and actions? One possible explanation is that perceptions of fairness and material benefit travel together hand-in-hand. In other words, those who gain from state action tend to view the overall picture of distributive justice more 'fairly' than those who lose out, and the winners will be more inclined to comply than the losers. As Levi points out,

... rulers can increase compliance by demonstrating that the tax system is fair. A perception of exploitation – that is, an unfair contract – promotes noncompliance ... Favoritism toward special interest groups, programs that they disapprove of, declining return for their taxes, the failure of some to comply can all violate taxpayers' norms of fairness. The consequence will be a decrease in quasi-voluntary compliance ... The decision to comply quasi-voluntarily has a normative root in that the compliant would prefer to promote the social good the tax bargain represents ... Quasi-voluntary compliance is one aspect of what is generally labeled legitimacy [Levi, 1988: 53–4]

This argument is plausible, but incomplete. It treats the concepts of 'favoritism' and 'special interest' unproblematically. And indeed, Levi is clear in stating that she believes circumstances can be 'objectively' determined when she states that

The terms ideology, socialization and legitimization have come to mean almost as many things as the people writing about them, but the definitions usually include a strong dose of what Marxists call 'false consciousness' or what rational choice theorists might label irrational behaviour ... *my claim is that people generally understand their own situation* (my emphasis) [Levi, 1988: 68].

By contrast, I argue that when considering the costs of compliance and the payoffs of state provision of goods and services, individuals in similar 'objective' (economic) circumstances can calculate payoffs or perceive special interests in quite different ways. How an individual evaluates his or her 'sacrifices' and 'rewards,' with respect to state action and the public economy are highly contextual and interpretive, and must be studied inductively.

As David Laitin [1986] convincingly points out with his ethnographic study of the Yoruba, self-identification with a group cannot be deduced merely from economic conditions or an analyst's 'common wisdom' about which cultural factors are politically salient. Certain identities carry political relevance for historically contingent reasons, and once defined, they can shape perceptions of self-interest, and frameworks for evaluating the normative implications of government action in quite powerful ways – even if seemingly 'irrational,' to the rational choice theorist.

In a later work, Levi softens her rationalist assumptions with a framework closer to the one being espoused here. She develops the notion of 'ethical reciprocity,' as an important motivator of consent, arguing that members of similar cultural or ethnic groups are likely to gain important information about who is paying. 'When there is no ethical reciprocity, there is less likelihood of contingent consent and compliance' [Levi, 1997: 25]. Such hypotheses resonate with those advanced by Hardin [1995], who points to the strength of 'group power'.

I attempt to demonstrate here that notions of fairness are not determined simply through 'objective' considerations of government action and/or the behaviour of others. Rather, I argue that affective feelings towards others within the political community literally colour how citizens interpret the fairness of state actions and state demands for economic participation in the affairs of the state (taxes). What citizens 'want' and what they are prepared to 'give' in return cannot be determined a priori from individual economic circumstances or levels and forms of government service provision.

Instead, an individual's perception of his/her own sense of shared political community with other groups has a more powerful and autonomous influence on what the individual recognises as desirable and fair. Of course, attitudes about political community are shaped by a variety

of factors and circumstances, but I will demonstrate that those attitudes are not merely a reflection of socio-economic circumstances or ascriptive characteristics. The legitimacy of the central state's demand for taxation is increased when a citizen's view of the nation is congruent with that defined by the state. Such citizens are more likely to believe that the state will serve 'their' group, rather than 'someone else.' Individuals who feel a shared collective identity with groups recognised as nationals by the state are much more likely to evaluate the provision of goods and services as fair and, at least from an attitudinal perspective, will be more inclined to meet the state's demands for tax payment than individuals who do not share that sense of collective identity, even when 'objective' economic circumstances and other characteristics are held constant. Notions of 'us' and 'them' or 'insiders' and 'outsiders' are imagined differently within society, even among individuals assumed to be 'similar,' explaining why net transfers are acceptable to some citizens and not others. In this argument, the calculation of economic costs and benefits is not simply given by objective circumstances, but is treated as an endogenous factor influenced by how individuals recognise others within the political community.

It is important to note that highlighting collective political identity as a key causal variable is also a refinement of theories emphasizing cultural or ascriptive variations as the basis for politics and citizenship behaviour.⁷ While language, skin color, or ethnic identity *can* form the basis for collective political identities, such factors do not *determine* views about the NPC. Moreover, while I recognise variations in cultural practices within and across countries, cultural variations *per se* do not explain associated variations in citizenship behaviour. Observed correlations between cultural groups and citizenship behaviour find their origins in struggles for political domination, not in the content of the cultures themselves.

II. NATIONHOOD, THE NATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNITY, AND THE STATE

State leaders derive authority from shared collective identity when citizen feelings of nationhood are basically congruous with the state's definition of the NPC. A strong sense of nationhood – which provides the promise of material and psychic rewards – has motivated individuals to curb consumer preferences for imports, to go to war and, at the extreme, to participate in genocidal killings and to sacrifice their own lives. At crucial moments, nationhood seems to 'solve' the collective action problem. Strong feelings of national identity can also compel people to feel a sense of duty with respect to their tax obligations because government spending with tax-based resources will presumably benefit the national public. While the concept of

the nation has taken on a variety of meanings in both practical and analytical usage, at its core, nationhood constitutes a bounded, political identity tantamount to the notion of a 'people'. Ernst Haas provides an excellent definition:

A *nation* is a socially mobilized body of individuals, believing themselves to be united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them (in their own minds) from outsiders, striving to create or maintain their own state. These individuals have a collective consciousness because of their sentiment of difference, or even uniqueness, which is fostered by the group's sharing of core symbols. A nation ceases to exist when, among other things, these symbols are recognised as not truly differentiating the groups from outsiders [Haas, 1986: 726–7].

Implicit in this definition is recognition of important *variation* in the construction of identity in the minds of individuals. If we consider that individuals may take on a range of political identities, it is useful to conceive of the nation as a 'terminal political community' [Emerson, 1960] – the most *expansive* source of identity for an individual in the face of adversity, which is articulated with imputations of a shared common ancestry and common destiny. In this sense, the boundaries of national identity encompass multiple sub-identities, even those which may generate internal conflict around particular issues.

Attempts to mobilise the nation aim to elicit *sacrifice*: behaviour that is motivated in terms of collective, rather than narrowly self-interested terms. Ernest Renan [1994: 17] explains, 'A nation is a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which one has made and those which one is disposed to make again.' Other theorists of nationhood have recognised the uniquely compelling power of national identity to generate collective action through such behaviour. Katherine Verdery [1996] makes the astute point that what makes nations seem so powerful is their assertion of common origins; the *notion* of birth – no matter how that concept is made operational – makes them seem 'natural.' The mobilization of the concept of shared destiny imparts the emotive power of 'winning or losing together', often preached to team members when asked to sacrifice individual glory for collective success. Anderson [1996: 7] explains, 'regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship ...'.

Analytically, the NPC is distinct from nationhood because the former is defined by the state while the latter is an identity experienced by individuals. We can hypothesise that those whose own sense of nationhood is coterminous with the NPC defined by the state will be more willing to

sacrifice for its maintenance through tax payments. In this way, collective identity and compliance are linked in two key ways: first, a state which embodies the nation commands a certain degree of legitimacy, simply because the fate of the collective becomes tied up with the fate of the state – which is in clear need of resources.

Second, views about the NPC serve to mediate the very calculations that make economic sacrifice seem economically ‘rational.’ Only when the citizen feels a common sense of nationhood with those in the NPC will collectively provided services and poverty-related transfers be interpreted as truly worthwhile and desirable rather than as transfers to ‘someone else,’ often interpreted as a squandering of resources. Those whose own national identity falls outside the NPC – who may doubt or reject their long-term attachment to the leaders and ordinary members of the national community defined by the state — are far more likely to discount long-term, future gains derived from the state’s efforts. Instead, such individuals are guided only by more narrowly individual economic logic, a logic which is far more likely to orient an individual *away* from inclinations towards compliance. Collective logic, in which individuals perceive collective and long-term benefits as *benefits*, is far more likely to induce quasi-voluntary tax payment. To the extent that the state attempts to promote some common welfare and sense of equality among its members, those who reject the terms of membership will view any redistribution as unjust – a transfer to ‘one of them’ rather than to ‘one of us’.

III. MEASURING COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN THE ‘NEW’ SOUTH AFRICA

South African society provides an excellent case for exploring the impact of different factors on citizenship attitudes and behaviour as a country with wide variations in individual-level economic conditions, cultural and ascriptive membership groups, and perceptions of collective political identity. Recent political change also provides a stimulus for citizens to evaluate their relationship with the state. A long history of political struggle and a recent political transition have inspired the redefining of the boundaries of NPC within a South African society long marked by enormous social diversity, particularly highlighted by a politicised racial identity. In popular discourse, the 1994 election in which all race groups were allowed to vote marked the beginning of the ‘new’ South Africa, and the end of the ‘old’ one, which was notorious for its development of political institutions enshrined in white supremacy. The political change in the country prompted a fierce debate among scholars of identity politics regarding the potential new bases for political mobilisation. In particular,

scholars and political leaders have debated whether or not race is the *sine qua non* for national identity – in other words whether the very notion of a single, multiracial South African nation is viable.

Although Donald Horowitz's influential book, *A Democratic South Africa?* [1991], analysed future prospects for political transition based upon the premise that the society was 'deeply divided,' many analysts have pointed out that it is problematic to *begin* with this assumption.⁸ All societies are 'divided,' along particular fault-lines but the nature and depth of those divides are constructed through politics, not simply *given* by the distribution of linguistic or phenotypical characteristics. To experience a sense of nationhood, individuals need not view the national label as their primary sense of identity in everyday life, but must accept some sense of common membership – even one in which they may 'agree to disagree' over various matters. In this sense, the vast majority of Americans – black and white – do today recognise the American nation as their terminal political community. Those who would call South Africa 'deeply divided' cast enormous doubt on the viability of a single, cohesive South African nation. Of course, such an outcome is possible, but I begin with the premise that this is not a foregone conclusion.

As in most societies, the range of *potentially* important political identities in South Africa includes a host of economic, regional, religious, ideological and ascriptive differences. For most of the twentieth century, race has constituted the most important cleavage within the country. We must begin by recognising that in the 'old' South Africa, the NPC – as defined by the state – was for whites only. As Defense Minister PW Botha⁹ put it in a 1977 White Paper on defence, '... the principle of the right of self-determination of the white nation must not be regarded as being negotiable. Military strategy forms part of a broader national strategy to ensure this.' His words and those of others at the time would suggest an almost primordial unity among white South Africans, but of course, the very notion of a (white) South African NPC was constructed only in the early part of the century. Moreover, among whites there has long existed an important divide between Afrikaans- and English-speakers. Nevertheless, this cleavage was generally viewed as less significant than the one between whites and blacks particularly by the 1970s when Botha mounted his defensive campaign to maintain the integrity of a white South African nation, while proclaiming that blacks were 'in fact' members of several other nations. For the majority of white South Africans who supported the government during the development of the apartheid system, the notion of a white South African nation was indeed a meaningful category – one that they were prepared to go to war for, and to sacrifice for – in return for the future benefits of maintaining the integrity of this collective.

From the perspective of the state, the definition of the South African nation has changed dramatically in the past decade. By the 1980s, it became quite clear that a South African nation bounded by skin colour was no longer viable and a new political dispensation was inevitable. The form of resistance that reigned as hegemonic in the final years of struggle helped to 'imagine' a non-racial South African nation – a newly defined NPC with people of varied colours and creeds. The new regime is based on this premise – as Archbishop Desmond Tutu has named it, the 'Rainbow Nation'. Without taking the metaphor too far, the rainbow suggests recognition of a wide variety of colours, living together in a tight band, but still distinctive in brightness and hue. Few would argue that race could disappear as a meaningful category in the country in the near term, but a larger academic, political, and public intellectual¹⁰ debate about nationhood questions whether the race groups constitute separate terminal communities or whether a single, multiracial nation can be imagined?

As found in the 1997 survey, for South Africa, the problem of collective identity is not one of titular pride: over 91 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement, 'I am proud to be South African.' Rather, the more contested question is whether citizens agree with the way in which the state defines who is and is not a member of this NPC. On this dimension, we can ask about national reconciliation in general terms and in terms of specific attitudes about their feelings of difference from other South Africans. The 'new' South African state's conception of the nation differs from the 'old' one in commanding acceptance, if not embrace, of individuals located across the racial divide.¹¹ If the apartheid philosophy emphasised what was *different* about the people living in the country, suggesting multiple nations, the new South Africa attempts to emphasise what is common. The constitution is clear in recognising the nation as inclusive of people of all race groups, so individuals who express opposition to the desirability of common membership or who strongly reject particular race groups are effectively rejecting the state's definition of the nation.

In order to assess individual attitudes about identification with the new NPC, I consider two sets of measures, reported in Table 1, and Tables 2a and 2b, evaluating attitudes for the entire adult population and for each of three major race groups.¹²

(a) Acceptance of the New National Political Community (NPC)

First, I assess individual opinions about the new definition of the South African NPC by measuring responses to general questions about the idea of building a 'rainbow nation', out of an historically divided and heterogeneous society. In particular, the survey asked questions about the possibility and desirability of building a single South African nation out of

all the groups in the country. When compared with the results of other groups, white respondents emerged as the most resistant to the new formulation of the South African NPC. As reported in Table 1, a full 43.6 per cent of white respondents said that they did not think it was possible to create a single South African nation from the different groups within society. Among Coloureds, 18 per cent said this was not possible, while 10.5 per cent of Blacks said this was not possible. Negative responses to this question can be interpreted as reflecting beliefs that the contemporary South African state's specification of the NPC does not seem viable. Given the legacy not only of privilege and exclusive citizenship status for whites, but generations of white supremacist ideology in South Africa, such results are not entirely surprising. A significant minority of whites are having a much more difficult time supporting the notion of a new NPC. Of course, from the perspective of South Africa's political history, these numbers could be seen as reasonably positive consensus towards the development of a multiracial nation, given a legacy of white support for apartheid government in prior decades.

TABLE 1
ACCEPTANCE OF THE 'NEW' NATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN
SOUTH AFRICA (1997)

Frequency of responses

'It is *desirable* to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country.'

Sample group	(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	(4) Disagree	(5) Strongly disagree
All SA's	37.2%	43.7 %	9.3%	7.1%	2.8%
Blacks	46.1%	40.1%	8.7%	4.6%	.5%
Coloureds	36.8%	57.3%	2.5%	3.1%	.3%
Whites	16.9%	44.7%	14.2%	14.7%	9.5%

'It is *possible* to create such a united South African nation.'

Sample group	(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	(4) Disagree	(5) Strongly disagree
All SA's	28.2%	36.0%	15.6%	15.2%	5.0%
Blacks	37.7%	37.7%	14.1%	9.4%	1.1%
Coloureds	26.8%	45.0%	10.3%	16.1%	1.9%
Whites	6.9%	27.6%	21.8%	27.9%	15.7%

(b) Feelings of Difference

Second, I assess individual feelings of difference from other South Africans. Theoretically and empirically, we can separate the more diffuse attitudes about the *idea* of the viability of the new NPC from more specific attitudes about one's *own* place in the NPC. Feelings of difference imply distance from the larger group. I calculate the strength of such sentiments with respect to one's own definition of a primary group identity (which may or may not be racially defined) as well as with respect to one's racial identity. Of course, individual citizens may identify with more narrow or more broad group identities than their national identity, without necessarily rejecting the NPC. When asked an open-ended question, 'Thinking about yourself, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?' South Africans responded with over 130 different group labels. However, feelings of tremendous difference from other groups undermine the sense of collective consciousness necessary for collective calculations. The survey asked about difference by referring to the respondent's chosen group and asking whether the individual agreed or disagreed with the following statement: (Members of the respondent's group), '... are very different from other South Africans.' Half of the respondents (49.5 per cent) either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, while the other half were either ambivalent or disagreed. Blacks and whites embraced difference to a greater extent than did coloureds, as about 50 per cent of both black and white respondents agreed with the statement while only about 40 per cent of coloured respondents agreed.

TABLE 2A
FEELINGS OF DIFFERENCE
OWN GROUP DIFFERENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1997)

'We have spoken to many people and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, for example Swazi, Venda, or Ndebele. Other people describe themselves according to their religion such as Methodist or Jewish. Still other people describe themselves in terms of their race, for example Asian or black, and some people describe themselves as working class, middle class or upper class. Thinking about yourself, which specific group to you feel you belong to first and foremost?.....'

(Follow-up) ' ____ people are very different from other South Africans'

Sample group	(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	(4) Disagree	(5) Strongly disagree
All SA's	17.4%	32.0%	17.3%	26.5%	6.8%
Blacks	19.5%	32.1%	14.1%	25.6%	8.7%
Coloureds	11.2%	28.7%	20.8%	33.9%	5.5%
Whites	16.0%	33.5%	22.7%	24.9%	3.0%

A second component of feelings of difference relevant within South Africa is race chauvinism – the disparity between a respondent's view of his/her own race group with that of the 'other' race group.¹³ Table 2b demonstrates how widely such sentiments vary within the population. The most extreme chauvinism was demonstrated by whites, with over 14 percent of those respondents saying they had completely favourable views of their own group and completely unfavorable views of blacks. Coloureds tended to be the most tolerant on average, with blacks scoring in the middle.

TABLE 2B
FEELINGS OF DIFFERENCE
RACE CHAUVINISM IN SOUTH AFRICA (1997)

'Now I would like to get your feelings about the following groups. Please tell me whether you have a favorable or unfavorable view of them ...'

	Prefer other group	View both equally	Prefer own group		
			Mild chauvinism	Moderate chauvinism	Complete chauvinism
Difference of feeling thermometers on two groups	(<0)	(0)	(1–3)	(4–7)	(8–10)
Blacks (View of blacks compared with view of whites)	1.6%	17.8%	35.6%	34.2%	10.7%
Whites (View of whites compared with view of blacks)	2.1%	21.7%	27.9%	34.0%	14.4%
Coloureds (View of coloureds compared with view of blacks)	0.9%	34.3%	30.6%	27.7%	6.4%

In considering both measures of political identity, however, it is important to recognise that blacks do form the majority of the population and since 1994, the state president and most – though certainly not all – cabinet posts have been held by blacks. It is hard to imagine that feelings about group identity would mean the same thing for all race groups. Quite clearly, if race is the dividing line between political 'insiders' and political 'outsiders', whites were the pre-apartheid insiders and blacks are now the post-apartheid outsiders, with coloureds falling in between during both periods. Of course, the denial of political rights to blacks during apartheid

stands in stark contrast to the multi-racial conception of rights in contemporary South Africa, but few would disagree that black South Africans are today 'in power,' and whites are 'out' of power, particularly when seen in historical perspective. It is thus reasonable to believe that self identification with the NPC would have a different impact on members of different race groups in this racially charged society.

IV. RESULTS: INCLINATIONS TOWARDS CONSENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Three hypotheses that can be tested with respect to the factors that influence citizen inclinations towards compliance: There is the 'null' rationalist hypothesis, which suggests that all individuals should be inclined to 'free ride', and that inclinations to comply for non-material reasons are 'extra-rational', and randomly generated. That hypothesis would suggest that no factors should predict variations in levels of compliance. The first alternative hypothesis is that variations in attitudes towards compliance will be most affected by 'objective' circumstances. In other words, concrete demographic and socio-economic factors along which costs and benefits are allocated unequally should predict variations in inclinations to comply. The second alternative hypothesis – the one being championed here – is that attitudes about the political community will be most influential over individual inclinations to comply. Those who agree with the state's view of the NPC and who feel close to other nationals will be more likely to comply than those who do not. Analysing survey responses from a 1997 national survey conducted by IDASA, I find that individual acceptance of the plural character of the South African nation is a more important determinant of inclinations towards compliance than any other socio-economic, political or cultural factors.

Measuring Inclinations to Comply

In the 1997 national survey, several questions were asked concerning attitudes about compliance with several state demands, including payment of income taxes (national taxes), rates (local government fees), and television licences (a general user fee, but unrequited in the sense that it is possible to purchase a television and to watch television without paying). These were measured with a series of questions in the form: 'Here is a list of actions ordinary people are taking in the new South African political system. For each of the following, please tell me whether you would do these things if you had the opportunity ... Avoiding paying your rates ... Avoiding paying income taxes ... Avoiding paying your television licence.' For each, the respondent had the opportunity to respond, 'I would never do this'; 'I might do this'; and 'I would definitely do this.' In order to create an

index of citizen consent, I added the responses – 0 for definite avoiders; 1 for maybe's; and 2 for never's – generating a seven-point scale with integer values ranging from 0 to 6.

TABLE 3
INCLINATIONS TOWARDS COMPLIANCE INDEX (1997)

	Score	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Non-compliant	0	70	4.3	4.8	4.8
	1	19	1.2	1.3	6.1
	2	46	2.8	3.1	9.3
	3	161	9.8	11.0	20.2
	4	180	11.0	12.3	32.5
	5	144	8.8	9.9	42.4
Fully compliant	6	843	51.4	57.6	100.0
Total Valid		1464	89.2	100.0	
Missing		178	10.8		
Total		1642	100.0		
Mean	Std. Deviation				
4.8461	1.6769				

As indicated earlier, it is important to be clear that I am measuring behavioural dispositions and not *actual* compliance, and as a result, the measurement is likely to have much greater validity and reliability than if we were measuring the extent to which individuals comply with the tax burden in practice.¹⁴

Although it is important to consider the range of variation in income levels within the sample, the validity of responses to questions about taxation by people living in informal settlements must be strongly questioned. In South Africa, such individuals live with extremely limited, if non-existent services and possess such limited income as to make the payment of such taxes virtually impossible. Asking about tax payment becomes a particularly abstract and hypothetical exercise. As a result, I consider only responses from individuals living in formal settlements. To be consistent, this is the sub-sample used for all of the analysis in this article. This still includes quite a wide range of variation in levels of income, while assuring much greater validity in the responses.

As shown in Table 3, a full 58 per cent of respondents said they would never attempt to shirk any of their obligations,¹⁵ while the remaining 42 percent varied in their levels of consent. Less than five per cent of

individuals said they would definitely attempt to shirk all of their obligations. The puzzle here is to explain what factors influence shifts up or down on this scale.

Objective and Subjective Factors

On the face of the bivariate results reported in Table 4, there would seem to be reasonably strong reason to believe that both 'objective' and 'subjective' factors influence citizen views about fairness and their inclinations to comply with demands for taxation. As suggested earlier, the post-apartheid government has emphasised redistributing resources and opportunities from the formerly privileged to the non-privileged. This has involved initiatives to re-allocate resources from high income and education groups, to lower ones; from men to women; from young to old; from wealthier provinces to poorer ones; and from whites to people of colour. Indeed, income, education level, gender, age, place of residence,¹⁶ and race are all correlated with inclinations towards compliance in the bivariate relationships, with the benefiting group being more inclined to pay in all cases.

Moreover, many of these factors are also associated with perceptions of what individuals believe they are receiving in terms of goods and benefits. Income, residence, and race were all strongly correlated with responses to questions about the impact of government as well as to questions about whether individuals felt they were getting a 'fair share' of government health, education, and police services. (However, in the case of gender and age, women and older people both tended to say they were getting less than their fair share when compared with the responses of men and younger people.) All of these statistical results do suggest that 'objective' policy decisions and changes influence individuals' views about their economic obligations to the state.

Yet, in the bivariate analysis, there is also strong support for the argument that attitudes about political community shape perceptions of fairness and individual inclinations to comply. Indeed, to the degree that individuals said they felt more similar to other South Africans and agreed with the notion of a 'rainbow nation,' they tended to say that they were benefiting from government action, that they were getting a fair share of services, and that they would comply with their economic obligations. It is also interesting to note that perceptions of corruption – which are negatively correlated with inclinations to comply – were themselves strongly associated with race and attitudes about the political community, but not with more 'objective' factors.

Although there is support for both sets of hypotheses, in order to assess the possible inter-relationships between these factors and their impact on inclinations to comply, we require a multivariate analysis. It is not possible

TABLE 4
BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS (1997)

Attitudes about:		Government impact on you	Perception of corruption in government	Getting fair share of educ, health, police	Compliance Index
Income	R	-.186	.056	-.051	-.125
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.049	.065	.000
	N	1313	1246	1315	1233
Education	R	-.153	.010	-.017	-.093
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.698	.498	.000
	N	1535	1462	1531	1459
Gender	R	.034	.005	-.067	.128
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.184	.852	.009	.000
	N	1541	1467	1538	1463
Age	R	-.055	-.030	-.053	.096
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.032	.245	.039	.000
	N	1541	1467	1538	1463
Rich Province	R	-.222	-.069	-.012	-.178
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.008	.638	.000
	N	1541	1467	1538	1463
White	R	-.360	.049	-.116	-.148
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.060	.000	.000
	N	1541	1467	1538	1463
Coloured	R	-.066	-.115	.084	.036
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.009	.000	.001	.174
	N	1541	1467	1538	1463
Feelings of difference	R	-.093	.078	-.163	-.172
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.004	.000	.000
	N	1456	1394	1446	1385
'Rainbow' nation	R	.301	-.092	.110	.237
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	1499	1438	1494	1426
Compliance Index	R	.155	-.130	.032	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.228	.
	N	1384	1341	1386	1463

to establish a clear, single direction of causation – there is likely some reverse causation – but it is possible to assess the relative impact of these factors while controlling for others.

Group Identity and Intentions to Pay Tax

I estimated the impact of various attitudes and traits on attitudes about compliance, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. First,

I report the results of this analysis for all race groups and then for each race group separately. These analyses provide robust support for the hypothesis that feelings about group identity are critical for inclinations to comply.¹⁷

Analysing the results for the entire adult sample reported in Table 5, we can see quite clearly that individual socio-economic circumstances such as income, and education have no independent causal effect, though age and gender do have moderate effects – older individuals and females were both more inclined to consent to their obligations. Particularly given the state's initiatives to offer universal health care to pregnant women, and initiatives to redress various gender inequalities in the provision of goods and opportunities in the post-apartheid government, it may be reasonable to believe that such improvements explain higher levels of good citizenship on the part of women.¹⁸

Of all the 'objective' circumstances, regional residence emerges as the most important determinant of attitudes towards compliance. Residents of poor provinces, benefiting from provincial transfers, said they would be less likely to cheat than residents of the rich provinces, and this relationship is both substantively and statistically significant.¹⁹

Slightly more subjective evaluations of government were moderately important as a determinant of attitudes towards compliance. Although specific evaluations of the degree to which individuals perceived they were getting a 'fair share' of education, health care, and policing were not important, the direct question of how favorable government action has been on the individual was a significant factor in the model.

As mentioned earlier, it is not possible to measure *actual* variations in levels of government corruption in a static survey. On the other hand, there was a fair amount of variation in the degree to which individual *perceived* such corruption was taking place in the government. The analysis demonstrates that individuals who perceived more corruption in government were less likely to comply.

Perhaps surprisingly, when controlling for other factors, race was not an important predictor of compliance. Depending upon one's perspective, race could affect inclinations to comply in different ways. Perhaps the most obvious is that whites, and to a lesser degree, coloureds, would be less likely to comply with demands made by a state controlled by blacks. Another view would be that there are cultural differences between the race groups. Yet, in both cases, weak coefficients and high standard errors, suggest that race alone is not an important predictor of inclinations to comply.

Rather, attitudes towards the NPC, including feelings of difference from other South Africans and acceptance of the general idea of a 'rainbow nation' were far and away the most important determinants of attitudes

TABLE 5
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION (1997)

Dependent variable is Attitudes Towards Compliance Index

Sub-sample	All		Blacks		Coloureds		Whites	
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t-value</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t-value</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t-value</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t-value</i>
Income	-.025	-.632	.017	.376	.078	.816	-.066	-1.087
Education	-.004	-.104	-.021	-.430	-.205*	-2.058	.012	.200
Gender	.102**	3.461	.107**	2.710	.173	1.961	.112	1.881
Age	.064*	2.024	.081	1.901	.025	.296	.057	.933
Rich Province	-.119**	-2.862	-.146**	-3.649	-.170	-1.822	-.065	-1.083
Government impact on you	.078*	2.301	.127**	3.015	-.095	-1.057	.093	1.578
Getting fair share	-.023	-.740	-.060	-1.463	.029	.300	.018	.286
Corruption	-.064*	-2.090	-.022	-.525	-.038	-.447	-.073	-1.168
White	-.045	-.922						
Coloured	.040	1.018						
Feelings of difference	-.153**	-4.982	-.002	-.054	-.196*	-2.131	-.353**	-5.237
Acceptance of 'rainbow' nation	.188**	5.414	.065	1.613	.269**	3.175	.203**	3.111
Adjusted R2	.16		.05		.11		.28	
N	994		623		140		229	
F	16.67**		4.20**		2.78**		9.76**	

Standardised Coefficients (Beta Scores) reported.

*p<.05 **p<.01

towards the economic obligation. These coefficients were both significant at the 0.001 level and substantively significant. As measured by the size of the standardised beta weights, acceptance of the 'rainbow nation' conception of the NPC was the most important predictor of willingness to comply. Greater tolerance and more generalised views of political community lead citizens to believe they *ought* to pay.

Although the coefficients for the race variables used in the analysis were insignificant, this should not imply that race is unimportant. First of all, attitudes and opinions about racial identity comprise an important component of both variables measuring attitudes towards the political community. Moreover, as discussed earlier, there is far less variation in the black sub-population than the white one with respect to the question of general attitudes towards the new national political community. This is understandable given the nature of the political transition in South Africa.

Analysing the OLS results for each race group separately, while

considering the same dependent variable, provides even greater insights into the calculus of politics within South Africa. A much different set of factors emerges as influential over each race group. First of all, the very low adjusted r-squared values for the coloured and black sub-samples suggest how little of the within-group variation can be explained by any of these factors. By contrast, a much larger portion of the variance can be explained within the white sub-sample. Indeed within the white sub-sample, there was more variation on the dependent variable than in the other two groups (Standard deviation for the compliance index was 2.02 for whites, 1.48 for blacks, and 1.54 for coloureds).

Although questions about political community were quite powerful in the multi-racial sample, they were not important within the black sub-sample. Responses to questions about the possibility and desirability of the new South African nation generated so much positive consensus among blacks that it is not really possible to test variation on this factor within this group. Although there was a wide range of variation on responses about feelings of difference, as suggested earlier, there is strong theoretical reason to believe that this factor would have less influence on black attitudes towards their citizenship obligations in post-apartheid South Africa than on other race groups. For this group, the only significant predictors of inclinations towards compliance were more 'objective' factors. Gender differences, provincial differences, and more general feelings about benefit from government action were the only truly important determinants of attitudes towards compliance.

By contrast, both among whites and coloureds, there was quite a bit of variation in the responses to the questions about political community, and these emerged as the most important predictors of inclinations to comply. Among coloureds, the most important factor was general attitudes about the new, rainbow nation. Among whites, feelings of difference from other South Africans carried by far the highest beta weight pointing out how important this attitude is in accounting for difference among whites in their willingness to consent to government demands. Whites with a strong sense of difference from other South Africans do not respect the legitimacy of the new state, whereas those that see more similarity than difference *do* respect the demands made for taxation by the new state.

South Africans view the state with rainbow-colored glasses. The analysis demonstrates that *evaluations of politics, economics and obligations to the state are largely conditioned by feelings of closeness or affinity towards other groups included in the state's definition of national political community.*

V. CONCLUSIONS

Because most analysis of citizenship behaviour has been conducted with respect to the nation-states of Western Europe, we should not be surprised that the *problem* of socially constructed collective identity has not emerged as critical to tax compliance. In those countries, state and citizen views of the national political community have been largely congruous – at least to a much greater degree than in a country such as South Africa. However, given the rapidly increasing transnational flows of capital, information and people, and the re-drawing of state boundaries, old national identities are increasingly being challenged and the factors considered here will likely be more relevant to the quality of citizenship, even in those societies.²⁰ From the results of this analysis, we may hypothesise that state attempts to collect revenue will be influenced by the congruity of state and citizen definitions of the political community. Much of the world, including sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia, can be treated as analytically proximate to the case of contemporary South Africa in that the problem of ‘who is us’ is quite clearly a question of political identity, not readily apparent from existing patterns or economic factors alone. In other highly unequal societies in which race and class are highly correlated – particularly in Latin America – reluctance to pay likely stems from political divides within the NPC. How political leaders mobilise visions of collective identity will be crucial to state building in these countries if the impact of collective identity on the perceived legitimacy of the tax demand is as strong as in the case of South Africa. Further research could assess the extent to which feelings of collective identity influence *actual* compliance both in South Africa and in these other transitional societies.

An examination of attitudes towards tax compliance in South Africa suggests that rationality is embedded in a particular orientation of what and who matters. Individual-level calculations about costs and benefits – benefits that include gratification of ideological or psychic rewards – are made within an overarching framework of identification with the state’s definition of the nation. The premise of most rational choice analyses, that individuals pursue utility-maximising actions, generally fails to recognise that with regards to citizenship and public life in general, most individuals perceive themselves as a member of a group. Because group identities cannot be deduced a priori from economic circumstances, or ascriptive or cultural characteristics alone, rationality is only useful as a guide for analysis after understanding the social and political salience of those characteristics.

With specific reference to South Africa, the findings shed additional light on the questions of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘nation-building,’ that have

been at the forefront of post-apartheid politics. Many scholars and other analysts have been critical of initiatives such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which have been identified as central to the state-led nation-building process. In an effort to achieve 'one-ness', analysts such as Mamdani [1998] astutely fear that the lines between victims, and victimisers, may become blurred. Other critics of the ANC's conciliatory stance with respect to white business charge that accommodation will simply maintain South Africa's dubious distinction as one of the most unequal societies on Earth [Marais, 1998; McKinley, 1997].

This article does not attempt to navigate an argument about the moral implications of post-apartheid nation-building, but it does attempt to highlight the finding that reconciliation and nation-building may provide more than 'psychic' rewards, or even stabilising influences, but concrete material implications in the form of fiscal transfers from rich to poor via the tax system. It seems highly plausible that the strong conciliatory gestures from ANC leaders since coming to power have helped to maintain relatively high levels of tax compliance among wealthier white South Africans. I am not suggesting that this should be a more important consideration than those identified by moral philosophers, but that these findings should be considered as part of the larger political landscape. Accommodation may facilitate the implementation of progressive social and fiscal policies, rather than impede them.

If the state requires a basic inclination towards voluntary compliance from its citizens to perform well, than the results described above suggest that the state's extractive institutions could be vulnerable to those individuals who do not accept the state's definition of the NPC. Of course, as mentioned earlier, other factors, including habitual compliance, and the state's coercive capacities, influence *actual* compliance. None the less, in a world with increasing opportunities to avoid payment, individual inclinations towards compliance are extremely significant. The evidence presented here suggests that the range of variation in feelings of collective identity can generate quite substantive variations in stated attitudes about compliance with the tax burden. And yet, as the analysis has revealed, ethnic or racial heterogeneity does not *necessarily* impart antagonism or chauvinism – it just does for *some* of the people. The state's demands for economic sacrifices or tax payments seem appropriate and legitimate when individuals feel close to the groups the state claims to serve – the national political community.

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NOTES

1. For other discussions of taxation and the relationship between state and taxpayer, see Levi [1988], Peters [1991], and Bates and Lien [1985].
2. See, for example, Ritschl [1964] and Von Stein [1964].
3. As Lewis [1982, 67] points out, it is useful to make the analytical distinction between 'behavioural intentions' and 'action.'
4. See various contributions in Slemrod [1992].
5. Migdal [1997] makes this distinction.
6. See, Smith [1992] and Scholz and Pinney [1995].
7. See, for example, Ekeh [1975], who argues that in many African societies, state bureaucrats may appear 'immoral' simply because their sense of duty is to a kinship group rather than to the 'civic public' defined by the state. Ekeh's characterisation of ethnic ties as 'primordial' is unfortunate, however, as this suggests that such bonds are almost genetically given as opposed to socially and politically constructed, as I would argue.
8. See Price [1995], for a similar argument about why Horowitz' [1991] characterisation needs to be reconsidered.
9. P.W. Botha would assume the position of State President of South Africa from 1984 to 1989.
10. See, for example, the exchange between Afrikaner intellectual Hermann Giliomee and ANC Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Pallo Jordan on the editorial pages of the South African Independent Newspapers in 1997.
11. Although Eric Louw [1997] argues that there exists two competing models – the 'rainbow nation' and a 'Black majoritarian' one – it is only the former that has been advanced as the state's official definition of National Political Community. The notion of 'Black majoritarianism' is perhaps better described as a label given by Whites to the new South African nation as a way of distancing themselves from it.
12. The apartheid state effectively constructed four race groups: 'Whites' (also referred to at various times as 'Europeans'); 'Blacks' (also referred to at various times as 'Natives' or 'Africans'); 'Coloureds'; and 'Asians' (also referred to at various times as 'Indians.') Regardless of one's views about the constructed nature of racial identity, these are meaningful categories in South Africa today, even after the end of apartheid. Many individuals reject these labels as a means of self-identification, but they continue to be central to political discourse in the country. The 'Asian' group is a very small minority in the country and represents such a small sample in the survey (only 41 respondents) that it is impossible effectively to analyse attitudes while controlling for other factors, and I have omitted this sub-sample from the analysis.
13. For white respondents, blacks are the 'other' race group, and vice versa for blacks. The question of the 'other' group for Coloureds is less clear – given their historical status as an intermediate group. Given the political climate in South Africa during 1997, and the large Coloured support for the National Party (which has almost no black supporters), blacks were scored as the 'other' for this group as well.
14. In the post-apartheid regime, in which whites and coloureds can be identified as political 'out' groups, one could hypothesise that members of these groups would be *less* likely to express an inclination to avoid their tax burden – even in a confidential survey – for fear of government or other forms of political retribution. While this potential measurement problem may create an upward bias on the overall estimates of inclinations to comply, if we assume that such effects are distributed evenly within the respective sub-populations, these potential biases should not alter our interpretation of the results and the estimates of the determinants of inclinations to comply. However, without additional measures of the validity of such responses as indicators of 'true' behavioural inclinations, it is not possible to estimate potential biases in the statistical results.
15. Indeed, actual tax compliance among White South Africans has been traditionally high, and this is evidenced by the high levels of income tax collected as share of GDP relative to other countries (approximately 15 per cent of GDP in 1997, while the average for all countries was less than seven per cent of GDP). Estimates of tax evasion in South Africa hover around 20–30 per cent of actual collections, whereas in a country such as Brazil, most analysts

estimate approximately a dollar of tax evaded for every dollar actually paid. There is a long history of black challenges to taxation under the apartheid regime (and under prior regimes), stemming from the perception that such regimes were illegitimate, and the logic of 'no taxation without representation.' Unfortunately, without longitudinal data on individual inclinations, it is impossible to compare how the particular variable being measured here has changed overtime in response to the changing political situation in the country. Although interviews with various tax collectors conducted by the author in 1997 revealed that there *has been* some improvement with respect to compliance among blacks since 1994, this has been minimal. Again, many factors, including education, likely affect this outcome quite independent of inclinations to comply.

16. Under the new federal constitution, there has been an emphasis on cross-provincial transfers, and the 'rich province' dummy variable is coded 1 for residents of Gauteng and Western Cape Provinces and is coded 0 for all others.
17. In all analyses, there was a high tolerance for all factors, suggesting that there is not a problem of multicollinearity.
18. On the other hand, Smith's [1992] analysis of compliance patterns in the United States found similar relationships with age and gender, suggesting that other sociological factors may be at work here. At the very least, these factors are useful controls in an analysis which attempts to measure the influence of a different set of independent variables.
19. See note 16.
20. For various discussions about the changing nature of citizenship and group identities, see contributions in Beiner [1995].

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APPENDIX

DESCRIPTION OF THE 1997 IDASA DIVERSITY SURVEY

The Public Opinion Service unit of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) designed the survey. Research Surveys Pty Ltd. conducted the fieldwork during June and July 1997.

Universe

All South Africans, 18 years and older.

Sample size

3500 interviews were conducted. Of that group, 1641 respondents were living in formal housing and were identified as either 'Black/African', 'Coloured', or 'White', the criteria employed for inclusion in the analysis. The small sub-sample of 'Asian' respondents were omitted because the sample size was too small for proper analysis, and only respondents living in formal housing were included to increase the validity of responses about tax payments.

Sampling method

A disproportionate sample was drawn because there was a particular interest in specific sub-groups ie. Rural Zulus in KwaZulu-Natal and coloured people in the Western Cape. A disproportionate sample was used in order to obtain a significant number in those sub-groups. Within each stratum, sampling points were selected at random. Five interviews which were randomly determined, were conducted at each sampling point.

Weighting

Due to the disproportionate sample, it was necessary to weight the data up to the universe, that is, the South African voting public (estimated to be 24.32 million). In accordance with previous studies, the sample was weighted to reflect the distribution of the different culture/language groups in each of the nine provinces. Results based on the total national sample have a margin of error of plus/minus three percentage points. Results based on smaller sub-samples will obviously have greater margins of error depending upon the number of interviews in that group.

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DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED

In all cases, missing values and 'don't know' or 'refused to answer' responses were discarded from the analysis.

Dependent Variable

Inclinations Towards Compliance Index: The index was created by adding responses to questions about three different citizen obligations requiring the payment of moneys to a public authority. The questions were asked in list form:

'We would just like to remind you that your responses to this interview are confidential. Here is a list of actions ordinary people are taking in the new South African political system. For each of the following please tell me whether you would do these things if you had the opportunity ...

- (a) '... Avoiding paying your rates.'
- (b) '... Avoiding paying income taxes.'
- (c) '... Avoiding paying your television licence.'

For each, the possible (valid) responses were: 1. 'I would definitely do this', 2. 'I might do this', and 3. 'I would never do this'

Responses were recoded on a 0-to-2 scale, and added together to create a 0-to-6 scale.

Independent Variables

Income: 'Purely for statistical purposes, we would like to know the total income of your household, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. You need only give me the letter of the group in which your income falls.' Respondent was handed a card with 20 possible responses for annual income, from no income to R10,000+; as well as 'don't know.' The interviewer also could code 'refused to answer.' The latter two responses were eliminated from the analysis.

Education: 'What is your highest level of education that you have passed?' Responses were recoded as follows: 10: No-education through grade two; 20: Standard 1-Standard 6; 30: Standard 8-Standard 9; 40: Matric (~High School diploma); 50: Some University; 60: University or higher degree.

Gender: Dummy variable coded as 1 for women.

Age: Truncated value of actual age divided by 10.

Rich Province: Dummy variable scored as 1 for residents of the Western Cape and Gauteng provinces and 0 for all other provinces.

Government impact on you: 'Over the past year, did the actions or decisions of the government have a positive impact, no impact or a negative impact on you personally?'
- Possible responses. 1. 'Very positive'; 2. 'Positive'; 3. 'No impact'; 4. 'Negative'; 5. 'Very negative' (re-coded in reverse direction).

Getting fair share: 'In comparison to other groups, do you think that you or people like yourself are getting more or less than their fair share of government resources with regard to: (a) educational opportunities; (b) health care; (c) policing.' For each, possible responses were: 1.

'Much more'; 2. 'More'; 3. 'About right'; 4. 'Less'; 5. 'Much less'. These scores were re-coded in reverse order and a factor score was created, with factor loadings: Education: .85; Health: .86; Policing: .78 (Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis).

Corruption: 'What about corruption, that is where people in government and in the civil service illegally use public moneys for their own benefit, or take bribes ... With regard to people who work in government departments or offices, how many officials do you think are involved in corruption?'

– Possible responses: 1. 'Almost all'; 2. 'Most, a lot'; 3. 'A few, some'; 4. 'Almost all'

White: Dummy variable coded 1 for respondents identified as white

Coloured: Dummy variable coded 1 for respondents identified as coloured.

Feelings of difference: Calculated as factor score of two variables (1) Responses to question: 'Do you agree or disagree with the following statements...(Own group – identified in earlier question) people are very different from other South Africans.' – Possible responses: 1. 'Strongly agree'; 2. 'Agree'; 3. 'Neither agree nor disagree'; 4. 'Disagree'; 5. 'Strongly disagree' And (2) Race chauvinism: difference between evaluation of own group and other race group. Evaluations based on, 'Now I would like to get your feelings about the following groups. Please tell me whether you have a favourable or unfavourable opinion of them. Please use this scale where 0 means completely unfavourable and 10 means completely favourable with 5 meaning neutral or neither favourable nor unfavourable.'

(Factor extracted through principal component analysis. Factor loadings = .74)

Acceptance of 'Rainbow' Nation: Calculated as factor score of responses to questions associated with prompt, 'Do you agree or disagree with the following statements ...'

(1) 'It is desirable to create one united South Africa out of all the different groups who live in this country,' and, (2) 'It is possible to create such a united South African nation.'

– Possible responses: 1. 'Strongly agree'; 2. 'Agree'; 3. 'Neither agree nor disagree'; 4. 'Disagree'; 5. 'Strongly disagree'

(Factor extracted through principal component analysis. Factor loadings = .87)